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STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: 
SMARTERSAFER.ORG AND THE BIGGERT-
WATERS ACT OF 2012 
ELI LEHRER† 
Like any complex legislative undertaking, the 2012 Biggert-
Waters Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization Act that 
President Barack Obama signed in July of 2012 represented dozens of 
compromises.1  No major party to the discussion over flood insurance 
reform got everything it wanted. No one who participated contends 
that the reform—despite its significance—put the flood insurance 
program on stable ground for the long term. For all of its flaws and 
limitations, however, the Biggert-Waters Act was a breakthrough in 
one sense: it was a law that both traditionally conservative free-
market groups and traditionally progressive environmental groups 
supported enthusiastically.2 
Like most people involved in the effort to pass the bill, I entered 
this process with an idealistic goal—get the government out of the 
flood insurance business. (I still want that, although I now realize it 
will take a long time.) My own role was that of a think-tanker: I do 
research with no particular clients in mind and try to share it as 
widely as possible in a way that impacts public policy. Given my 
background and think-tank work, this goal was a natural one: I have 
spent the great bulk of my professional career at right-of-center think 
tanks that fight the environmental movement and have worked on 
Capitol Hill for a Republican Senate Majority Leader. All in all, I am 
a pretty conventional conservative. I voted for Mitt Romney, hate 
 
         †    Eli Lehrer is president and co-founder of the R Street Institute, a free-market think 
tank based in Washington, D.C. He was previously a vice president of the Heartland Institute 
and has worked for the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute. He also 
served as a speechwriter to Senate Majority Leader William H. Frist, M.D. 
 1.  Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 
405 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4001–4129 (2006)). 
 2.  See, e.g., House’s Planned Flood Insurance Reforms ‘Good Start,’ But Not ‘Perfect’, 
TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.taxpayer.net/media-
center/article/houses-planned-flood-insurance-reforms-good-start-but-not-perfect (presenting a 
summary of various groups’ positions on the bill in a press conference held soon after near-final 
legislative language was revealed). 
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high taxes, like guns, oppose abortion, and want vastly smaller, less 
intrusive government. I am deeply suspicious of bureaucratic 
rulemaking and believe that environmental protection must 
sometimes take a back seat to economic growth. Although I count a 
number of environmentalists as friends, enjoy the outdoors, and 
believe that climate change is real, a problem, and human-caused, I 
likely do not count as a “green”—even a conservative green—by any 
commonly held standard. For example, I disagree with nearly every 
major environmental initiative the Obama administration has 
launched and think that current campaigns against natural gas 
development are misguided. 
Yet, through SmarterSafer.org, some other conservatives and I 
became close policy allies of many environmentalists. This Essay is 
about this “strange bedfellows” coalition called SmarterSafer.org that 
I helped found, which helped pass the Biggert-Waters Act. In the 
next few pages, I describe the final bill itself, outline the role that 
SmarterSafer.org played in helping Congress shape what became law, 
describe how SmarterSafer.org came into being and operates, and 
offer some potential lessons that SmarterSafer.org’s experience may 
hold for environmental activists and free-market conservatives who 
want to find common cause. 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO BIGGERT-WATERS 
The Biggert-Waters Act may well be the largest revamping of the 
flood insurance program since its origin in 1968.3 The law does four 
major things. First, it raises insurance premiums for some “non-
conforming properties” that have been provided flood insurance at 
below-market rates since their communities first joined the program, 
generally in the 1970s.4 Second, it establishes a variety of new 
procedures—including another level of oversight through a technical 
mapping advisory council—intended to improve the maps used to 
define flood rates, incorporating “the best available science”—
including science related to potential climate change—into these new 
maps.5 Third, it allows premiums charged to insured properties to rise 
 
 3. COMM. ON FIN. SERV., SECTION BY SECTION SUMMARY: THE BIGGERT-WATERS 
FLOOD INSURANCE REFORM ACT OF 2012 (2012), available at  
http://www.ciab.com/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=3208&libID=3230. 
 4.  Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act, Pub. L. No: 112-141. §§ 100215(d), 
100216(b) (H.R. 4348, 112th Cong., 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS--‐
112hr4348enr/pdf/BILLS--‐ 112hr4348enr.pdf. 
 5.  See id. §§ 100215–100216. 
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at a significant rate on the basis of the new maps.6 Finally, it allows—
but does not require—the program to begin the process of 
transferring a portion of the nation’s flood risk to the private sector 
through the purchase of reinsurance.7 Together, these efforts put the 
flood program on a distinctly different course: they end the bulk of 
explicit subsidies for development in environmentally sensitive areas; 
greatly improve the maps used to determine which properties pay 
what rates for flood insurance; and give private industry a small 
opening to begin assuming flood insurance risk. 
Regardless, the bill does not contain many of the ideas that 
played a role in the conversation about flood insurance over the 
years. By renewing the program, the bill continues a near-total 
federal government monopoly on writing primary flood insurance for 
private homes and smaller businesses for at least another five years. 
As a proponent of the free market, this is not what I wanted. 
Likewise, language that would have expanded “mandatory purchase” 
of flood insurance for holders of federally backed mortgages to 
“residual risk” areas located behind levees (essentially areas that 
would have to purchase flood insurance but for the existence of a 
levee) never made it into the passed version of the bill.8 The 
program’s massive, almost certainly impossible to pay debt to the 
United States Treasury—which increased by another $12 billion in 
the wake of Hurricane Sandy—also went unaddressed in the final 
bill.9 
In short, the Biggert-Waters Act was not a total win for any party 
involved and certainly did not achieve all the goals I had when the 
process began. Additionally, we need time to fully assess the Act’s 
virtues and limitations and to determine how successfully its vision is 
implemented. Nonetheless, both environmental and free-market 
groups hailed the Act as a victory. For free-market groups, higher 
rates and tentative steps towards private companies taking 
responsibility for flood risk raised the prospect that the size and scope 
 
 6.  Id.  § 100205. 
 7.  Id.  § 100232. 
 8.  The language was originally included in § 100206 of the committee report but was 
deleted from the final version. 
 9.  Adam Martin, Obama Signs Aid Bill on Sandy’s Three-Month Anniversary, N.Y. MAG. 
(Jan. 29, 2013, 11:36 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/01/obama-signs-sandy-aid-
bill.html. 
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of government might be reduced over time.10 For environmental 
groups, the Act presented an opportunity to discourage development 
in floodplains, particularly in light of climate change.11  Finally, some 
insurers believed the bill would be better for their business and would 
encourage improved preparedness in particularly disaster-prone 
areas.12 
This unusual coincidence of objectives was borne out through 
SmarterSafer.org. Although the specifics of the bill were drafted 
largely by Congressional members and staff, several major ideas from 
SmarterSafer.org and its members ended up in the law. As a leading 
participant in SmarterSafer.org, I took part in numerous meetings 
and helped draft memoranda that influenced the shape of the bill. A 
few portions of the final law—for example, § 100216’s creation of a 
technical mapping advisory council—were taken directly from 
SmarterSafer.org proposals. Furthermore, the broad outlines of the 
bill closely reflected SmarterSafer.org’s own statement of principles.13 
In short, SmarterSafer.org did more than just sign letters or issue 
positions: it had a real, measurable influence on public policy. 
II. THE GENESIS OF SMARTERSAFER.ORG AND ITS SUCCESS 
Like many other coalitions of strange bedfellows, 
SmarterSafer.org was born in a time of crisis. In mid-2007, the House 
of Representatives passed legislation that would have created a 
national catastrophe backstop, making taxpayers ultimately 
responsible for a large portion of the nation’s coastal insurance 
costs.14 The proposal had support from the nation’s two largest 
 
 10. R.J. Lehmann, R Street Welcomes Agreement on Reforms to National Flood Insurance 
Program, R STREET INST. (June 29, 2012), http://rstreet.org/news-release/r-street-welcomes-
congressional-agreement-on-national-flood-insurance-program-reforms/. 
 11.  See Matt Gannon & Joshua Saks, Senate Must Act on Flood Insurance, LAS VEGAS 
REV. J. (April 18, 2012), http://www.lvrj.com/opinion/senate-must-act-on-flood-insurance-
147883235.html (showing a combined insurer and environmental perspective). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  See SmarterSafer.org Statement of Principles, SMARTERSAFER.ORG, 
http://www.SmarterSafer.org/uncategorized/smartersafer-org-statement-of-principles (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2013) (focusing on building smarter, encouraging safety, using nature, insuring 
based on risk, assuming responsibility, and targeting government assistance). 
 14. Press Release, Committee on Financial Services, House Passes Klein-Mahoney 
Homeowners’ Insurance Bill (Nov. 8, 2007), available at 
http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/press110/press110907.shtml.  For an analysis of how 
taxpayers would ultimately be responsible for the costs, see generally ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & 
APARNA MATHUR, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PROPOSALS FOR FEDERAL NATURAL 
CATASTROPHE REINSURANCE AND NEW LOAN PROGRAMS: WHO PAYS AND WHO BENEFITS? 
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homeowners’ insurance companies as well as from a variety of other 
interests, including local insurance agents and the New York City 
Mayor’s Office.15 As a result, it seemed to me and many of my 
colleagues that the federal government was going to start interfering 
in property insurance markets by selling subsidized insurance with 
premiums far lower than those found in the free market to people 
living in coastal areas, and that there was nothing that could be done 
to stop it. 
As a free-market activist, then running a small insurance project 
for a free-market think tank, the Competitive Enterprise Institute 
(CEI), I did not like this and did not know anyone in the free-market 
movement who did either. To supporters of the free market, federal 
takeover of property insurance represents an oversized, over-
powerful government’s latest effort to ruin a functioning private 
market. The concept of moral hazard further lends itself to concerns 
that government-run insurance would ultimately lead to more 
destructive development in coastal areas.16 The bill, while passed 
freestanding, was debated largely in the context of the flood 
insurance program that was then moving forward in Congress. 
Although some of the companies that were then supporting my 
work protested vigorously—many had written more homeowners’ 
insurance policies than they should have in hurricane-prone areas and 
wanted the government to assume the risk for them—my bosses at 
the CEI stood by me even after it became clear that my donors would 
not. My own first efforts to fight back—a coalition letter signed by a 
few friends I had worked with at the American Enterprise Institute 
and a few other groups—was just one of several hundred such letters 
a typical office in Congress receives each day; even though I worked 
on the Hill myself and have many friends there, none of them even 
mentioned it to me. As such, I believe almost nobody read it. 
Presentations I made at Grover Norquist’s Leave Us Alone 
Coalition’s Wednesday meeting, at similar meetings at the state level, 
 
(2008), available at http://www.abir.bm/downloads/Report_on_the_Effects_of_Proposed_ 
Hurricane_Legislation-Shapiro-Mathur-August_2008.pdf. 
 15.  These interests organized themselves into a coalition called protectingamerica.org. Its 
full membership list can be found at: http://www.protectingamerica.org/coalition-members. Not 
all members necessarily support all objectives. 
 16.  Moral hazard is the lack of incentive to protect against risk created when some or all of 
the consequences of that risk are removed. All insurance creates some moral hazard. When 
subsidies or government provision of insurance shield risk takers from even paying a risk-
adjusted premium, the incentives to take risks that may be socially harmful are particularly 
intense. 
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and at the House of Representatives’ Republican Study Committee 
meeting were always received politely but never resulted in much 
action. My fellow conservatives were more interested in fighting 
President Obama’s plans to take over the healthcare industry than 
they were in dealing with a complicated, wonky flood insurance bill. 
At one point, I believed that the bill would become law and that there 
was nothing I could do about it. I focused my attention on Florida, 
where Governor Charlie Crist had just rammed through a major 
expansion of the government’s role in the state’s insurance market.17 
This soon changed. While crossing a street in Tallahassee after a 
meeting with potential allies in Florida, I received a call from a flood 
insurance expert who then worked for the National Wildlife 
Federation. He invited me to a meeting with others who had written 
and thought about flood issues and, because I had read his work in 
writing my own master’s thesis on the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, I immediately accepted despite my suspicion of 
the environmental movement. 
The first meeting, which took place at the offices of a major K 
Street law firm retained by a reinsurer, included a number of 
conservative activists I had worked with in the past, an insurance 
lobbyist I had met once before, some other lobbyists I had never met, 
and some environmentalists I did not know at all. What surprised me 
was that the environmentalists in the room did not just sympathize—
they actually got it: most people nodded when I suggested privatizing 
the flood program altogether as a long-term goal and the most 
enthusiastic response came from the same environmental leader who 
had invited me to the meeting. And that is how what became 
SmarterSafer.org began. 
Under the initial banner of Americans for Smart Natural 
Catastrophe Policy (the name was changed to SmarterSafer.org a 
year later) the e-mails flew around the coalition and the government 
outreach individuals after each meeting joined by coalition members. 
Within about six weeks of the first meeting, a collection of 
environmental activists, free-marketers, and insurance interests had 
met with an outright majority of the offices in the United States 
Senate. In May of 2008, less than a year after the passage of the bill 
seemed assured, the Senate rejected a companion measure to add 
 
 17. See Fla. Gov. Crist Signs Property Insurance Bill, INS. J. (Jan. 25, 2007), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2007/01/25/76298.htm (explaining the passage 
of the bill and its terms). 
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hurricane wind coverage to the flood insurance program, which would 
have accomplished much the same thing as a “backstop,” by an 
overwhelming 73-19 vote.18 (The actual House measure that brought 
the coalition together never got a Senate vote.) As a result of 
continued pressure from members of SmarterSafer.org, neither I nor 
anyone else I know in the coalition saw any similar legislation ever 
come to a final floor vote in Congress again. 
This quick victory led to an offensive phase: in 2009, 2010, and 
2011, members of the same coalition met with offices all over the Hill 
to push an agreed-upon agenda on flood insurance, mitigation, 
insurance policy in general, and wetlands preservation.19 Some 
efforts—like tax credits intended to encourage property mitigation—
went nowhere. Some bigger efforts also fell by the wayside: my own 
major priority going into the debate, a pilot program that would 
encourage experimentation with purely private flood insurance, had 
the support of major environmental groups but never gained support 
from the insurance industry. Indeed, not a single well-known primary 
insurance company was willing to step forward and offer to 
participate in such a program; without this, it was not credible to press 
forward on the idea of phased privatization. 
III. LESSONS FROM SMARTERSAFER.ORG 
Through frequent but largely informal conversation, 
SmarterSafer.org helped build consensus and alert everyone to what 
was and was not possible. Its membership fluctuated over the years. 
Some groups expected to be paid for signing letters and dropped out 
when they were not; others left over policy disagreements; others just 
lost interest. Nonetheless, the coalition remained a true “strange 
bedfellows” coalition of groups that rarely agreed on much.20 
Membership in SmarterSafer.org includes some insurance groups like 
the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (the 
nation’s largest property and casualty insurance trade association), 
the Reinsurance Association of America, and household-name 
insurers like Chubb and USAA. Other participants include 
environmental groups like the National Wildlife Federation and 
 
 18.  Jim Abrams, Senate Rejects Adding Wind Coverage to Flood Insurance Program, 73-19, 
INS. J. (May 12, 2008), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2008/05/12/89918.htm. 
 19.  SMARTERSAFER.ORG, supra note 13. 
 20.  William Gibson, Group Formed To Oppose National Catastrophe Fund, S. FLA. 
SUNSENTINEL (May 27, 2009, 4:40 PM), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2009-05-
27/news/0905280108_1_homeowners-private-insurance-market-disasters. 
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American Rivers, as well as right-of-center groups like the American 
Conservative Union, National Taxpayers Union, CEI, and R Street 
Institute (the small conservative think tank that I now head). 
These groups have drastically different views on issues outside of 
the coalition’s purview. Coalition member CEI, for example, 
questions whether or not climate change deserves a public policy 
response,21 while members like the National Wildlife Federation and 
American Rivers consider a response to climate change to rank 
amongst their top public policy priorities.22 Based on my five years of 
experience with the coalition, I would offer a few pieces of advice for 
people seeking to create similar coalitions on environmental issues 
that involve parties with vastly different views. 
A. Recognize That Environmental Concerns May Not Always 
Dominate 
Although I do care about the environment, it is not what gets me 
up in the morning. On flood insurance, I was far more interested in 
privatizing a destructive government program for its own sake than I 
was in the environmental benefits that might result from doing so. 
Some environmentalist friends have told me that they do not care 
about flood insurance privatization so long as they get a more 
sensible floodplain management policy. Likewise, while insurance 
interests tended to lean towards conservation-oriented practices—
insurers have long been leaders in corporate America’s efforts to deal 
with climate change—they quite properly put business concerns 
ahead of any particular environmental goal.23  While every member of 
SmarterSafer.org cares about the environment, less than half of 
SmarterSafer.org’s members would self-identify as primarily 
environmental groups. This actually made the coalition more 
effective. Not all lawmakers—much less all Americans—put the 
environment on top of their priority lists and hearing about 
environmental issues from perspectives other than that of the 
 
 21.  Michael Shnayerson, A Convenient Untruth, VANITY FAIR, May 2007, available at 
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/05/skeptic200705. 
 22.  Global Warming, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, http://www.nwf.org/Wildlife/ Threats-to-
Wildlife/Global-Warming.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2013); Climate Change & Rivers: Preparing 
for the Impacts of Climate Change, AM. RIVERS, http://www.americanrivers.org/ 
initiatives/climate/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). 
 23.  See, e.g., Al Lewis, Global Warming no Hoax to Insurance Companies, 
MARKETWATCH.COM (Sept. 9, 2011), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2011-09-
09/commentary/30750008_1_climate-change-climate-research-community-global-warming. 
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environment can actually help convince people to take certain actions 
that environmentalists favor.  
B. Keep Things Informal 
SmarterSafer.org has never been incorporated, raised a dollar in 
its own name, or run paid advertising. It has no staff of its own, no 
dues, no president, and no bylaws. Things are so informal that one of 
the groups that most influences its activities, the centrist budget 
watchdog Taxpayers for Common Sense, is actually an affiliate 
member of the coalition that does not endorse all of 
SmarterSafer.org’s statements. (It has disagreed with some mitigation 
tax credits SmarterSafer.org has pushed.) On a day-to-day basis, a 
lobbying firm retained by one of the corporate partners involved with 
SmarterSafer.org provides administrative coordination, an e-mail 
hub, and arranges occasional in-person meetings. A vice president of 
the firm—a respected former congressional staffer who worked on 
the Hill during the coalition’s early days—serves as meeting chair, 
referee, and ringmaster for the sometimes unruly coalition. Large 
group calls and meetings take place periodically and smaller groups of 
heavily involved individuals talk informally by e-mail much more 
often. SmarterSafer.org position papers—on disaster policy, floods, 
and housing—are issued about once a year and are typically the 
product of collaborative work. The result of this has been that the 
coalition is easy to join and easy to leave: participants take what they 
need from it and give what they can. This helps the coalition remain 
broad and effective. 
C. Seek Limited Consensus 
SmarterSafer.org never tried to seek consensus on the issues that 
many of its members considered most important: it never developed a 
group position on climate change (in meetings I attended, 
conservative groups objected) or a stance firmly for or against the 
idea of privatizing the flood insurance program (primary insurers 
objected in the same meetings). Instead, it sought consensus amongst 
its members where it could be achieved without members giving up 
key parts of their missions or sacrificing their identities as 
“conservatives,” “insurers,” or “environmentalists.” Plenty of issues 
fell by the wayside as a result. Sometimes issues were left out of 
SmarterSafer.org’s agenda because of priorities rather than ideology. 
For example, as a vice president of the Heartland Institute, I worked 
outside of SmarterSafer.org to educate Congress about a new way to 
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split losses between private insurers and the national flood insurance 
program that eventually became law as part of the final bill.24 Nobody 
in the coalition openly opposed this legislatively-determined 
allocation process as far as I know—although some insurers would 
have preferred it not become law—but enthusiasm for it was also 
wanting. 
D. Do Not Question Motives 
Conservatives, a few progressive friends tell me, are all in the pay 
of big, sinister corporations.25 Environmentalists, more than a few 
conservatives say, are “watermelons” (green on the outside, red on 
the inside) that seek to use environmental concerns to forward a 
socialist or communist agenda.26  Both of these statements contain a 
grain of truth: some conservative activists, just like some 
environmental activists, do in fact serve as donor mouthpieces. Some 
environmentalists are far more concerned with establishing their 
vision of a just society, which includes central planning of large 
portions of the economy, than they are with the environment per se. 
But this is not the norm. Even the types of corruption that exist on 
both sides do not always result from stereotypical or sinister motives. 
In almost any setting, when people act for reasons that are not 
noble—desire for personal fame, for example—these motives usually 
are not particularly sinister or secret but, rather, reflections of 
ordinary human foibles that most share. In any case, it is not 
particularly productive to question other groups’ motives even if they 
really are sinister. If one can more effectively accomplish a given goal 
by working with any group that does not promote violence or hatred, 
then refusing to work with such a partner on principle is almost 
certainly going to be counterproductive. This does not mean that 
serious disagreements should not be allowed and did not happen with 
SmarterSafer.org: all environmental groups abhorred the Heartland 
Institute’s position that climate change was not a crisis and did not 
significantly result from human causes.  One of my colleagues at the 
 
 24.  Scott Richardson & Eli Lehrer, Solving the Flood/Wind Problem After Hurricane 
Losses: The Case for a Standardized Loss Allocation System, THE HEARTLAND INST. 2 (June 
2011), http://heartland.org/sites/all/modules/custom/heartland_migration/files/pdfs/30236.pdf. 
 25.  See, e.g., Mark Pocan, Inside the ALEC Dating Service, PROGRESSIVE, Oct. 2011, 
available at http://progressive.org/inside_alec.html (explaining how conservatives are paid by 
corporations). 
 26.  See, e.g., Thomas DiLorenzo. Why “Environmentalists” Are Called “Watermelons,” 
LRC BLOG (Dec. 7, 2009, 8:07 AM), http://www.lewrockwell.com/blog/lewrw/ 
archives/44417.html (calling environmentalists “watermelons”). 
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Heartland Institute, likewise, questioned my participation in 
SmarterSafer.org on the basis that the Heartland Institute ought to 
work to abolish the Environmental Protection Agency, repeal almost 
all environmental laws, and defeat the environmental movement in 
every possible way.  Environmentalists remained in the coalition with 
me, however, and, until the Heartland Institute decided to launch a 
billboard campaign comparing climate change believers to terrorists, I 
largely ignored my colleagues who dealt with climate change. (After 
that, my colleagues and I working on insurance issues quit our jobs 
with the Heartland Institute and founded R Street Institute.) 
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS 
In the wake of the Biggert-Waters Act’s passage, 
SmarterSafer.org has stayed together and is currently focusing its 
efforts on disaster management. SmarterSafer.org did not try to do 
too much at the same time. It focused on a few goals and achieved 
most of them. On a daily basis, SmarterSafer.org did not try to change 
the world or convert any group to any other group’s way of thinking: 
conservatives were able to forward conservative ideas and 
environmentalists were able to forward environmental ideas. Hearts 
and minds did not change. But mutual understanding advanced. And 
public policy did change—not radically, but in a very real way. 
 
